Postcommitment: An Analysis and Reevaluation of the Right to Treatment by Foianini, Ray A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 2 Article 6
12-1-1975
Postcommitment: An Analysis and Reevaluation of
the Right to Treatment
Ray A. Foianini
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ray A. Foianini, Postcommitment: An Analysis and Reevaluation of the Right to Treatment, 51 Notre Dame L. Rev. 287 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss2/6
NOTES
POSTCOMMITMENT: AN ANALYSIS AND REEVALUATION
OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
I. Introduction
During the nineteenth century, bizarre or unusual behavior subsequently
labelled mental illness was thought to be caused by disease.1 The disease theory
stemmed partially from the fact that at that time a significant number of be-
havioral disorders were organic in nature-the result of syphilis.2 Terminology
commonly associated with physical infinnities such as "patient," "illness," "hos-
pital," "diagnosis," "therapy," and "cure" were similarly in relation to mental
disorders.3 The idea soon developed that people suffering from the "sickness"
could best be "treated" within mental "hospitals."4 In essence a treatment
paradigm had been created.
While there undoubtedly still exist numerous organic causes for behavioral
problems, the recent trend has been developing away from the solitary disease
concept.' It is increasingly being recognized that mental illness is a very broad
and ambiguous label, generally referring to a wide range of social behavior.'
Behavioral and sociocultural theories defining mental illness as essentially
problems in living have gained wide acceptance.' As a consequence of the
diversity of sources from which deviant behavior can stem, any single ap-
proach to defining and alleviating mental illness is ineffectual. Yet, this is pre-
cisely what society has done. The conceptualization of mental illness as a "sick-
ness" has led to development and perpetuation of state mental hospitals. While
the trend has been away from the overly simplistic medical approach, society has
failed to respond and has not created nonmedical alternatives with which to
remedy the problems. Perhaps the reluctance to do so is due in part to the per-
vasiveness of the treatment paradigm itself coupled with the fact that mental
hospitals are a relatively inexpensive device for removing social undesirables from
1 See 0. MILTON, BEHAVIOR DISORDERS: PERSPECTIVES AND TRENDs 1-12 (1965).
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 5.
4 See generally A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949). The
medical approach to mental illness is illustrated by the following excerpt:
The remarkable achievements of medicine had been based on the conception of disease
as a state of affairs or a process which had a specific etiology, a predictable course,
manifestations describable in signs and symptoms, and a predictable outcome modifi-
able by certain describable maneuvers. Mental illness became described according to
the same basic notions. The discovery of knowledge of some etiological agents like the
[syphilis] spirochete provided justifiable basis for the expectation that the problem
about the etiology of mental illness could be solved along similar lines as in medicine.
... In this framework psychopathology is viewed as an in-dwelling property of the
patient, as something the patient has.
R. Hornstra, The Psychiatric Hospital and the Community (unpublished paper presented at the
Annual Workshop in Community Mental Health, June 1962, cited in MILTON, supra note
1, at 3).
5 See Mm'ToN, supra note 1.
6 See generally T. MILTON, THEORIES OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PERSONALITY-ESSAYS
AND CRITIQUES (1973); T. SzAsz, THE MYrH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
7 See generally MILTON, supra note 1.
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the mainstream of society.8 Whatever the reasons, the lack of realistic alternatives
for the nonmedically mentally ill poses serious legal problems as to the states'
power to involuntarily confine such individuals in these restrictive mental
facilities.
Traditionally, the legal rights of mentally handicapped individuals confined
to institutions have rested with administrative agencies and only given cursory
treatment by state legislatures.' As a result, the mental patient has suffered great
deprivation of individual liberties and is subjected to a dehumanizing environ-
ment.10 While the courts have considered who shall be committed and for what
duration, 1 the issue of postcommitment responsibilities has only recently caused
judicial concern. The ambiguous nature of mental illness and a perceived lack
of expertise on the part of judges have largely accounted for this dearth of
judicial intervention. 2
In recent years increasing attention has justifiably been given the rights of
mental patients in the postcommitment environment.'" As Judge Bazelon noted
in Covington v. Harris, "it makes little sense to guard zealously against the pos-
sibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the
watch once the patient disappears behind the hospital doors."' 4
Because of social concern over the disarray and deplorable conditions found
in certain mental institutions, 5 the courts have been receptive to legal challenges
8 The cost of community-based programs is generally regarded as more expensive than
the institutional approach. See generally R. Moos, EVALUATING TREATMENT ENVIRONMENTS:
A SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL APPROACH (1974).
9 See Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEO. L. J. 680
(1969).
10 See T. SzASz, LAW LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). For a discussion of the in-
adequacies of mental institutions in this country, see E. GOFFMA, ASYLUMS (1961); Solomon,
The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American Psychiatry, 115 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1 '(1958).
11 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 275 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds.
1973).
12 See note 96 & accompanying text infra. See also Bazelon, Foreword to a Symposium on
the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 676 (1969).
13 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966); N. KITTaE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY
(1972).
14 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
15 These conditions are exposed in the following cases concerning institutional conditions:
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 2486
(1975); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), hearing on standards ordered, 344 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), standards enforced, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
For example, in Wyatt, Alabama's principal facility for the mentally retarded had been
evaluated by the A.A.M.D. [American Association for Mental Deficiency] several years
before commencement of the Wyatt litigation. The evaluation identified numerous
conditions that were incompatible with even the most primitive notions of human
decency. For example, evaluators found that in a ward of ambulatory severely re-
tarded young boys: "Ground food was brought to the day room in a very large
aluminum bowl along with nine metal plates and nine metal spoons. Nine working
residents were sent in to feed these 54 young boys from this one bowl of food and
nine plates and nine spoons. The feeding was accomplished in a total state of con-
fusion. Since there were no accommodations to even sit down to eat, it was impos-
sible to tell which residents had been fed and which had not been fed with this
system."
[December 1975]
made by confined mental patients.1 " The primary vehicle for implementing the
legal rights of these patients has been the right to treatment concept. While it
cannot be denied that mental patients do have legal rights, the treatment concept
and its development require critical analysis. The concept appears to be an ex-
tension of the treatment paradigm in that it attempts to rectify inadequate con-
ditions within mental hospitals instead of addressing mental illness in a broader
context. Even if the right to treatment concept were fully implemented there
would still remain numerous, needlessly involuntarily confined individuals suf-
fering from nonmedical problems for whom the best of state hospitals and treat-
ment provide no relief.17 The liberty and fundamental rights of these individuals
must be considered before the judiciary acquiesces in society's blunder of incar-
cerating social deviates under the guise of their need for treatment or the mental
illness label. The position taken herein is that the right to treatment concept
and its corresponding standards represent an inadequate approach.
II. The Right to Treatment Concept
The impetus for the concept of the "right to treatment" originated with a
1960 article by Morton Birnbaum, an attorney and physician."8 Bimbaum's
basic thesis argued that if society sought to deprive an individual of his liberty in
order to provide care and treatment, courts should ensure that such treatment
is in fact provided.
Rouse v. Cameron 9 first recognized this right to treatment. Charles Rouse
had been committed to a state mental institution after being found not guilty
by reason of insanity for carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor having a
maximum one year sentence.2" Four years after being involuntarily committed,
Rouse sought release on a habeas corpus petition contending that he was not
receiving adequate treatment and was no longer insane. Judge Bazelon, writing
for the court of appeals, held that Rouse possessed a statutory right to treat-
The conditions of gross neglect identified by the A.A.M.D. had not been cor-
rected several years later when the Wyatt litigation was instituted. Indeed, as Judge
Johnson found, conditions in the facility endangered life itself. Thus, shortly before
the filing of suit four residents died due to understaffing, lack of supervision and
brutality. One had a garden hose inserted in his rectum for five minutes by a work-
ing inmate who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow inmate hosed him with
scalding water; another died when soapy water was forced into his mouth; and the
last died by a self-administered overdose of drugs which had been inadequately
secured.
Brief for American Association on Mental Deficiency, et al. as Amicis Curiae at 28 n.4
5
,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). See also B. BLATT, SOULS IN ExTREmis(1973).
16 See note 15 supra. See also In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Stachulak v.
Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb.
1973); Burchett v. Power, 355 F. Supp. 1278 '(D. Ariz. 1973); United States v. Pardue,
354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973). For cases involving juvenile detention facilities, see Nelson
v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex.
1973); Inmates v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). See generally Pyfer & Bailey,
Deprivation of Liberty and the Right to Treatment, 7 CLEARINGHiOUSn Rxv. 519 (1974).
17 See generally SZASZ, supra note 6.
18 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
19 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
20 Id. at 452.
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ment;21 the case was remanded for a hearing on whether the petitioner had in
fact received adequate psychiatric treatment.2
Rouse was a landmark decision because it was the first case to hold
that society has a legal duty to provide adequate treatment and to ensure that
confinement for purposes of treatment does not degenerate into punishment.
Although Rouse was premised on statutory grounds, dicta in the opinion sug-
gested that failure to provide treatment could raise serious constitutional ques-
tions of due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment."
A constitutional basis for the right to treatment for involuntarily committed
mental patients was in fact established in Wyatt v. Stickney 4 The dismissal of
99 employees at Alabama's Bryce Hospital triggered a class action suit which
challenged the quality of care and treatment received at the hospital. The
plaintiffs, guardians of those involuntarily committed patients, contended that the
failure to provide adequate psychiatric treatment had deprived the patients of
their liberty without due process of law. The district court agreed, noting that
when mental patients are committed involuntarily through noncriminal proceed-
ings without constitutional protections that are afforded criminal defendants,
"they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treat-
ment as will give them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or
her mental condition." '25 The court reasoned that adequate and effective treat-
ment was constitutionally mandated because, absent treatment, the hospital was
transformed
into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense.... To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due
process.
26
Although Wyatt was a significant judicial breakthrough for the right to
treatment, it was not until Donaldson v. O'Connor27 that the underpinnings of
the new right were articulated in detail. In 1957 Kenneth Donaldson was com-
21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966) provides:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his hos-
pitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The admin-
istrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all medical and psychiatric
care and treatment received by a person hospitalized for a mental illness and the
records shall be made available, upon the person's written authorization, to his
attorney or personal physician.
22 373 F.2d at 461.
23 Since this difference rests only on the need for treatment, a failure to supply treatment
may raise a question of due process of law. It has also been suggested that a failure
to supply treatment may violate the equal protection clause. Indefinite confinement
without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so
inhumane as to be "creel and unusual punishment."
Id. at 453. For a discussion of the constitutional arguments in favor of a right to treatment
suggested in Rouse, see Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rv. 1134, 1137-47
(1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J.
87 (1967).
24 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
25 325 F. Supp. at 784.
26 Id. at 784-85.
27 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
[December 1975]
mitted to the Florida State Mental Hospital." Fourteen years later he secured his
release through a habeas corpus proceeding by claiming that even if he were
mentally ill, he had not received adequate treatment."' Recognizing that civil
commitment entailed a massive curtailment of liberty,"' the court of appeals
sought to identify the governmental interests which could justify such depriva-
tions. The court concluded that only where the individual was dangerous to
himself, dangerous to others, or in need of psychiatric treatment could the state
constitutionally civilly commit a person against his will." The court reasoned
that in parens patriae commitment, the only justification for confinement was
treatment of the individual and that fundamental due process required that
treatment be rendered."3 Where justification for commitment was danger to
self or others, the state was found to have a duty to extend treatment as the
quid pro quo for its right to deprive individuals of their liberty in exchange for
the safety of society. 4
III. Evaluation of the "Treatment" Theory
As in Wyatt, other courts have approached the right to treatment concept by
analyzing the nature of commitment itself.3 " It is generally recognized that a
state can commit an individual through either its power as parens patriae or its
police powers.30
The common law did not address involuntary civil commitment and related
problems for the simple reason that mental institutions were virtually non-
existent. 7 However, under English law at the time of the American colonial
period, the King had the authority to act as "the general guardian of all infants,
idiots, and lunatics."3 " In acting as parens patriae, the King or his representative
was required to promote the interests and welfare of his wards but was not em-
powered to sacrifice the ward's welfare for the welfare of others." During "lucid
28 Donaldson had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic.
29 The action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
30 The original complaint was filed as a class action on behalf of all patients on Donald-
son's ward. It sought damages for plaintiff and the class, habeas corpus relief for the entire
class, and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate treatment.
31 493 F.2d at 520.
32 Id. At the district court, instructions to the jury suggested that treatment is constitu-
tionally required only if mental illness alone, rather than danger to self or others, is the reason
for confinement. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2491 n.6 (1975).
33 493 F.2d at 520-27. The use of the parens patriae power to confine the mentally ill in
order to facilitate their rehabilitation is commonly traced to In re Oakes, 8 L. RP. 122 (Mass.
1845). Chief Judge Shaw held that "the great law of humanity" justified depriving an insane
person of his liberty whenever his "own safety or that of others requireld] that he should be
restrained for a certain time, and [when] restraint [was] necessary for his restoration, or [would]
be conducive thereto." Id. at 125. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill., 87 Hxv.
L. REv. 1209 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Civil Commitment].
34 493 F.2d at 522-25.
35 See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
36 For an extensive discussion of these powers and civil commitment in general see Devel-
opments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33.
37 See Lessard v. Schmidt 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972), quoting 1 B , x-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 305 (Christian ed. 1827).
38 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *47. The statute De Praerogativa Regis was enacted between 1255 and 1290
to regulate the Crown's actions in caring for the estates and persons of idiots and lunatics.
See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33, at 1207.
39 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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moments" the lunatic, or incompetent, was permitted to manage his own
property, and to generally exercise his civil rights. He was also entitled to an
accounting from the King.4 It appears that the development of the parens
patriae doctrine in this country originated from the earlier English statute. 1 The
Supreme Court has suggested that like the police power, parens patriae power is
vested in the very nature of the state. 2
The due process basis for the right to treatment contemplates the state acting
in the role of parens patriae. Justice Wisdom has summarized this approach:
"where the rationale for confinement is the 'parens patriae' rationale that the
patient is in need of treatment, the due process clause requires that minimally
adequate treatment be in fact provided."4 3 Nevertheless, the state functioning
as parens patriae should not necessarily have as its only goal the treatment of the
individual. The focus on institutional treatment distorts and shortchanges the
basic doctrine of parens patriae. The state as parens patriae is obligated to pro-
mote the total interests and welfare of the individual. English precedent dearly
demonstrates this point.4 Treatment within an institution is only one possible
means of protecting or promoting the welfare of a significant proportion of in-
dividuals found in mental institutions. Community-based residential facilities
and other semicustodial or noncustodial programs are preferable alternatives. 5
The institutionalization approach is an outgrowth of the antiquated treatment
paradigm predicated on the assumption that those labeled as mentally ill can be
best helped by being placed in a "hospital" for their "sickness" and then
"treated."46 In reality, the state, instead of assisting and protecting the individual,
has acted in a police power capacity," protecting society by sweeping social
deviates off the streets and into institutions for "treatment."4
Since treatment is not the purpose for confinement in the police power com-
mitments, 9 the quid pro quo rationale was developed as a means of extending
the right to treatment to individuals who were confined under this label.50 The
courts developed the idea that since civil commitment proceedings under the
states' police powers lacked the same procedural safeguards accorded in criminal
proceedings,5" a constitutional right to treatment would serve as the quid pro quo
for the relaxation of criminal due process standards." Chief Justice Burger and
40 Id.
41 Id. See note 33 supra. See generally Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33.
42 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
43 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 503, 521 (5th Cir. 1974).
44 See notes 38-41 & accompanying text supra.
45 See generally Moos, supra note 8.
46 See generally S. BRAxEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1971);
DEUTSCH, supra note 4; Pyfer, supra note 16.
47 Parens patriae commitments are ostensibly for the benefit of the individual while police
power commitments serve the state interest in protecting public safety. See generally Develop-
ments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33.
48 See Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HAv. Crv. RiGHTs-Crv. Lra. L. REv. 513
(1973).
49 See note 47 supra.
50 See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1974).
51 See generally Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
52 The requirements of due process are not static; they vary depending upon the impor-
tance of the interests involved and the nature of subsequent proceedings. Lessard v. Schmidt,
[December 19751
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others have been quick to point out the inadequacy of this approach." The
theory assumes that treatment is required whenever a state seeks to confine an
individual through the use of its police powers. As Chief Justice Burger points
out, this assumption is easily refuted, for it is impractical and naive to assume a
,duty of treatment exists when the state imposes a quarantine to protect the public
from communicable diseases. 4
IV. Inadequacies of the Existing "Treatment" Concept
While the right to treatment concept grew out of and developed as response
to the unsatisfactory conditions existing in public mental institutions,55 it has not
yet achieved its founders' goals. Inadequate conditions still exist in state facilities
and individuals remain incarcerated, often receiving only custodial care.5" The
concept has not been adequately developed, nor applied so as to recognize the
constitutional rights of mental patients in the postcommitment setting. The
theoretical development of the concept has been unsatisfactory both in terms of
scope and result.
The doctrine was first advocated as "the recognition and enforcement of
the legal right of a mentally ill inmate of a public institution to adequate medical
treatment for illness."' 7 While subsequent legal theory has developed out of.this
treatment paradigm, the emphasis on securing mandatory treatment for the in-
voluntarily confined has diverted attention from more fundamental problems of
commitment.
Instead of shaping legal theory to remedy an inequitable situation, scholars
and courts alike have focused only on developing situations where the state is
required to provide medical and psychiatric care for involuntarily committed
mental patients.58 This judicial emphasis is insufficient, since it continues to
ignore the nonmedical aspects of mental illness resulting from the states' failure
to deal comprehensively with the problem. 5
Additionally, application of the right to treatment concept is unsatisfactory
because it requires treatment only for the involuntarily committed patient."0
Patients voluntarily committed are denied similar constitutional protections,6
and therefore terminology again creates artificial legal distinctions that lack
substance and remedy.62 While patients may enter an institution voluntarily, they
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). For application
to the right to treatment issue, see Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rav.
1134, 1140 (1967).
53 See Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct.
2486, 2495-2500 (1975).
54 Id. at 2499.
55 See notes 13-17 & accompanying text supra.
56 See note 15 supra.
57 See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
58 Id.
59 See notes 1-8 & accompanying text supra.
60 Both courts and commentators have focused on the civilly or criminally committed
patient's right to treatment. See generally Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An
Administrative-Law Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to
Treatment, 61 VA. L. Rav. 297 (1975).
61 Existing legal theories were developed around the involuntarily committed mental
patient.
62 See notes 1-8 & accompanying text supra.
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are often not permitted to voluntarily leave the facility. 3 Most states statutorily
provide that the "voluntary" patient will be permitted to leave-five or 10 (or in
some cases 30) days after he notifies the hospital unless during that time the
hospital initiates involuntary commitment proceedings.6 4 Whenever "volun-
tary" patients are not permitted to leave the institution at will, 5 they should be
afforded the full constitutional safeguards granted involuntarily committed pa-
tients, since in terms of actual freedom they are equally deprived, regardless of
any label used to describe their commitment.
The strongest argument for discarding past right to treatment rationales and
replacing them with constitutionally grounded theories which would protect
against encroachment of fundamental rights is the benefit of eliminating the
treatment paradigm itself. Right to treatment cases have progressed on the
assumption that treatment is an adequate remedy to postcommitment depriva-
tion of civil rights. In turn, remedies have centered on the implementation of
medical and psychiatric care. 6 The logic being employed is the same that led
to the development of mental institutions-namely that mental illness is a "sick-
ness" susceptible to treatment.
The right to treatment is both naive and dangerous. It is naive because it
considers the problem of the publicly hospitalized mental patient as a medical
one, ignoring its educational, economic, moral, religious, and social aspects.
It is dangerous because its proposed remedy created another problem-
compulsory mental treatment... in a context of involuntary confinement.67
If treatment were defined broadly enough to include both medical and non-
medical approaches, then past treatment theories might have been of value.
However, this has not been done.6" Courts typically have attempted to ensure
that adequate medical and psychiatric treatment is provided only within the
institution, instead of looking at legal alternatives to confinement. " The imple-
mentation of a limited medical solution to what may be basically a social problem
is neither legally nor morally satisfactory.
V. An "Alternative" Approach
Efforts to secure postcommitment rights have failed for the most part to
develop a more basic underlying issue involving the deprivation of fundamental
liberties.7 0 It is undeniable that civil commitment involves a critical loss of liberty
63 See B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 36-40 (1973).
64 Id. at 37.
65 The patient should be permitted to exit at will or within a reasonable period of time
thereafter.
66 See Hoffman, supra note 60.
67 Szasz, The Right to Psychiatric Treatment: Rhetoric and Reality, 57 GEo. L.J. 740
(1969).
68 The current impetus of the right to treatment concept has focused on the improvement
of conditions within the institutions themselves.
69 See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33. In Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the court ordered imposition of the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment, but relied on the existing scope of community alter-
natives.
70 But see, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 473 (1974). See notes 71-82 & accompanying text infra.
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in the constitutional sense. 1 Accordingly, confinement must rest on a considera-
tion that society has a compelling interest in such deprivation. When a state
exercises its power and infringes upon fundamental rights, the public interests
advanced must be "compelling" and the action taken must be the least restrictive
alternative which will serve those interests."2 The least restrictive alternative
doctrine, first alluded to by the Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 3 has been
applied to civil commitment. 4
In Lake v. Cameron,5 the court maintained that the commitment statute
required judicial inquiry into less drastic alternatives than involuntary commit-
ment to a state mental institution. That same court later noted that due process
likewise required an examination of less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization.'
Further, in Lessard v. Schmidt,77 a three-judge federal district court held that the
party recommending involuntary civil commitment must bear the burden of
proving what alternatives are available, what alternatives were investigated,
and why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable.7 8 The search for
alternatives is based on the idea that "the most basic and fundamental right to
be free from unwanted restraint ... [and therefore persons] cannot be totally
deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic means for achieving the same
basic goal." 79
Application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to the postcommit-
ment setting has gained limited recognition. The Wyatt court applied the
principle that the state is required to investigate alternatives and select the least
restrictive in reference to the state's providing treatment." Similarly, a federal
district court in Minnesota has ruled that the doctrine of least restrictive alter-
native should apply to the services provided at the Minnesota State Hospital for
mentally retarded persons.81
Specifically, the final decree in Welsch v. Likins ordered that no mentally
retarded person could be committed to a state hospital if the necessary services
and programs were available in the community.82 It further directed that persons
suffering from retardation could not be committed to state institutions unless they
were additionally suffering from psychiatric or emotional disorders and treatment
at such a facility would be appropriate." While neither of the above cases have
71 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
72 See, e.g., Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 Hv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-
1132 (1969); Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33.
73 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
74 See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
75 364 F.2d at 659-60.
76 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
77 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
78 349 F. Supp. at 1096.
79 Id. Possible alternatives to civil commitment were suggested by the Lessard court.
They included voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital,
placement in the custody of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a
community mental health clinic, and home health aide services.
80 The Wyatt court, however, did not order the creation of alternatives outside of already
existing facilities in the community.
81 Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 '(D. Minn. 1974).
82 See Nat!l Center for Law and the Handicapped Inc., Welsch Court Orders Implementa-




ordered the creation of alternatives, it is clear that the least restrictive alternative
doctrine is viable in the postcommitment setting. Furthermore, Likins, by pro-
hibiting the admission of mentally retarded individuals to state hospitals, can be
seen as an expansion of the applicability of the least restrictive alternative con-
cept-requiring that it be extended to the initial commitment phase itself. Most
recently, in Donaldson the Supreme Court recognized the possible applicability
of the least restrictive alternative doctrine by citing the Shelton case and by
stating:
that the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the
unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness
does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an
institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to
save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for
raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom,
on their own or with the help of family or friends.8 4
Incorporation of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to the postcommut-
ment setting could alleviate many of the shortcomings of existing right to treat-
ment theories. First, the idea that postcommitment rights should be contingent
on, or stem from, the initial mode of commitment is unfounded. 5 As a pre-
liminary point, clear distinctions between police power and parens patriae com-
mitments are not always specified nor may they be distinct from one another."s
The state, through the use of labels applied in the commitment process, should
not be able to avoid its constitutional responsibilities. Whether an individual is
going to be civilly incarcerated in an institution for his own or society's benefit
is irrelevant when considering the loss of liberty.
More importantly, fundamental liberties are at stake in any type of civil con-
finement."' The ongoing deprivation of liberty itself compels the imposition of the
less drastic alternative doctrine. The burden should be on the state to justify the
total deprivation of liberty characteristic of institutions. Secondly, when the
state restricts a person's liberty for the declared purpose of providing a service,
then it is constitutionally obligated to provide that service by the due process
clause.88 The state should not be allowed to indefinitely confine individuals who
are labeled mentally ill under the guise of "treatment," when a realistic appraisal
of mental illness and the inadequacy of institutions as a treatment method reveals
a dramatic need for alternatives.88
The argument exists that if less drastic alternatives to institutionalization
are lacking, the doctrine has no practical significance, and the loss of liberty will
84 O'Connor v. Donaldson 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493-94 (1975).
85 See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
86 See generally Marshall, A Critique of the "Right to Treatment Approach," in THE
MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT To TREATMENT 38 (G. Morris ed. 1970). When civil commit-
ment is used to protect both the individual and society from harm, the state is acting both as
parens patriae and under its police power. Such a situation would not be unusual. See note
47 supra.
87 See note 71 & accompanying discussion supra.
88 See generally Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974).
89 See notes 1-15 & accompanying text supra.
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continue." This viewpoint assumes that inadequate resources can serve as a
justification for the deprivation of constitutional rights, and that courts are in-
capable of ordering the creation of alternatives. Neither contention withstands
a comparison to case law.91 The Wyatt court expressly stated that, "the un-
availability of neither funds, nor staff and facilities, will justify a default by de-
fendants in the provision of suitable treatment for the mentally ill."92 Although
there are no decisions in the postcommitment field ordering the creation of alter-
natives, courts have done so in other areas on numerous occasions.93 It is only
through the untenable logic characteristic of the old treatment paradigm94 that
implementation of the less drastic alternative doctrine will be forestalled. While
the state does have an interest in providing for its unfortunate, this interest and
the means utilized must be balanced with the individuals' constitutional rights.
If society is unable to provide satisfactory alternatives, as justice so requires, at
the very least the individual deserves the option of having his freedom restored.
Release in this situation is the satisfactory alternative, and courts should not
hesitate ordering it.
VI. Implementing Postcommitment Rights
Until science advances to the stage where behavioral disorders are more
accurately and fully understood, problems and mistakes in commitment itself will
continue, and postcommitment rights will require close scrutiny. To date the
major obstacle to effective judicial enforcement of a constitutional right to treat-
ment and similar rights has been the lack of ascertainable and enforceable stan-
dards for monitoring the postcommitment setting. Commentators as well as
critics argue that the ambiguous nature of mental illness itself defies judicial
evaluation and precludes the implementation of practical standards.9" Conflicting
theories of psychiatry and a wide array of treatment therapies have led at least
one court to hold that the treatment issue does not provide "judicially ascertain-
able and manageable standards."9
Future judicial acceptance of a constitutional right to treatment9" and other
constitutionally required rights may ultimately hinge on the development of
practical standards through which courts can evaluate individual needs and en-
sure that the least restrictive alternative is being utilized.
90 See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 33, at 1245-53.
91 Id. The following cases have held that inadequate resources can never be an adequatejustification for denying any person of his constitutional rights: Inmates v. Einstadt, 360 F.
Supp. 676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973) (pretrial detention); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182,
1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (pretrial detention ); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
311 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (desegregation). For
decisions requiring the creation of alternatives, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 1341 (1972).
92 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
93 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972).
94 See notes 1-15 & accompanying text supra.
95 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975) (concurring opinion); Green-
wood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1957); Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective
Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. Rzv. 936. 941-48 (1974).
96 Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
rev'd sub noa. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
97 "Treatment" as used herein includes both medical and nonmedical treatment.
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Proponents of the right to treatment concept have expressed varying views
concerning constitutionally mandated standards of care." Likewise, courts have
taken diverse approaches to the type or amount of treatment which should be
accorded individual patients.9 The initial standard applied in Rouse consisted
of the following criteria: whether the hospital had made a bona fide effort to
cure or improve the patient; whether the treatment administered was adequate in
light of present knowledge; and whether the hospital had determined initially,
and periodically thereafter, the patient's individual needs and conditions in order
to ensure individualized treatment.' 0 The vagueness and generalities of the
standards included in Rouse reflect the fact that it was the first judicial inquiry
into the components of a right to treatment.
Judge Bazelon acknowleged that the Rouse standards were underdeveloped
by stating in a later article "[t]he next criticism that adequate treatment stan-
dards are sorely lacking . . . is similarly true beyond cavil."'' Yet, he was
quick to point out that "the fact that treatment may take many forms, while
possibly complicating the implementation of the right to treatment, need not
defeat it,"'1 0 2 and later in the same article, "[i]t is critical that society and its
representatives be made aware of the failure of its promises so that they make an
honest choice to take constructive action or withdraw the promises."'0 3
The ambiguous and unascertained standards in Rouse were partially clarified
in the Wyatt' " case. Relying on Rouse and other District of Columbia circuit
court cases,' the first Wyatt opinion held that persons involuntarily committed
for purposes of treatment "unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental condition."'0 6 Because Bryce Hospital was
undergoing reorganization at the time, the district court reserved judgment on
the question of whether or not the patients were receiving adequate treatment.'
The second published Wyatt opinion resulted from the state's failure to
implement acceptable standards.0 There, the district court specified three
minimum conditions essential for adequate and effective treatment: a humane
psychological and physiological environment; qualified staff in sufficient numbers;
98 Compare Schwitzgebel, supra note 48, with Hoffman, supra note 60.
99 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (habilitation); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("bona fide effort" to cure a improve); In
re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972) (proper treatment); Nason v. Superintendent, 353
Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (adequate treatment).
100 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
101 See Bazelon, Foreword to a Symposium-Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 676, 677
(1969).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 679.
104 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), hearing on standards ordered,
344 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1972), standards enforced, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
105 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
106 325 F. Supp. at 784.
107 The Wyatt court did find, however, that programs of treatment prior to reorganization
were insufficient in that they "failed to conform to any known minimums established for
providing treatment for the mentally ill." Id.
108 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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and individualized treatment plans."" As a result of the state's inability to
develop satisfactory standards, the petitioners and amid were allowed to submit
proposed standards for judicial review. The result was judicial approval of
35 "minimally adequate" standards.11 The standards accepted"' can be
classified into two categories: (a) those applicable to the institution as a whole,
and (b) those pertaining to the individual patient and his needs. On the insti-
tutional level, standards were designed to ensure a clean and comfortable en-
vironment through regulations governing sanitary facilities, temperature and
living space." Other standards involved staffing ratios and training and licens-
ing requirements for treatment personnel."8
On the individual level, the court found the following criteria to be con-
stitutionally minimum standards for insuring adequate treatment: a statement of
the nature of the specific problems and specific needs of the patient; a statement
of the least restrictive treatment conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of
commitment; a description of intermediate and long-range treatment goals, with
a projected timetable for their attainment; a statement and rationale for the
plan of treatment for achieving these intermediate and long-range goals; a speci-
fication of staff responsibility and a description of proposed staff involvement
with the patient in order to attain these treatment goals; criteria for release to less
restrictive treatment conditions; and criteria for discharge." 4
As Rouse was a landmark case in breaking the ice for recognition of a con-
stitutional right to treatment, Wyatt is a landmark in the implementation of
the right. The identification of objective, minimally adequate constitutional
standards should act as an impetus to other courts to carefully scrutinize the post-
commitment rights of mental patients.
Wyatt is not, however, a panacea; standards by themselves are meaningless.
Furthermore, the standards promulgated in Wyatt are directed toward quanti-
tative goals."' Even with well-articulated standards and individual treatment
plans, there is no assurance that the patient is actually being helped or pro-
gressing.
6
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court noted, "at the least due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
109 Id. at 1343. The court held that although the state was deficient in the three areas,
the court would defer appointing a master to oversee the operation of the hospital because
the defendants had demonstrated a desire to obtain minimum medical and constitutional
standards. Id. at 1343-44.
110 344 F. Supp. at 379. According to Dr. Stonewall Stickney, Commissioner of Mental
Health at the time of the original litigation, 90 percent of the standards ultimately set were
stipulated to by the parties in advance of the hearings. The refusal "to defend anything that
was not defensible," as Stickney put it, led to severe criticism. Dr. Stickney was dismissed
in September 1972, by the Alabama Mental Health Board. PsYcHrATwc Naws, Oct. 17, 1973,
at 23, col. 1.
111 Not all of the proposed standards were accepted by the court. See 1 LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 287-88 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973).
112 344 F. Supp. at 381-82.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 384.
115 For an in-depth analysis of the Wyatt standards, see Hoffman, supra note 60.
116 There is no constitutional mandate requiring a state to cure mental patients. Neither
is there a constitutional obligation for the state to provide for its mentally ill. See Welsch v.
Liklins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974). However, once the state undertakes to con-
fine the individual, constitutional safeguards must be accorded.
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relation to the purposes for which the individual is committed."' 17 Accordingly,
the courts instead of merely focusing on the types and quantity of treatment
should give more emphasis to its duration and effectiveness. While judicial
evaluation of particular therapies is both unsatisfactory and impractical, improve-
ment, or lack thereof, in the particular patient provides a more ascertainable
and reliable means for evaluation."' Long-term, involuntary confinement of a
patient given only custodial care would require the court to carefully analyze his
records and determine if the state could continue the confinement against the
patient's will in that particular setting. Such an approach would decrease the
numerous instances, where, as in Kenneth Donaldson's case," 9 individuals are
removed from the mainstream of society and deposited for life terms in mental
institutions. While ambiguity concerning the etiology of an individual's illness
may exist and mistakes made leading to confinement in a mental hospital, the
erroneous belief that "treatment" will benefit the individual must be abandoned
at least where long-term confinement fails to produce noticeable results. An
honest mistake is nevertheless a mistake and should not be perpetuated. The
longer the duration of confinement and treatment without reasonably noticeable
improvement in the patient's functioning capabilities-the stronger the inference
that the state has failed its obligation to apply the less drastic means.
VII. Enforcement of Postcommitment Rights
Assuming judicial or legislative acceptance of a right to treatment or other
theories involving postcommitment rights, there will be a need for the effective
enforcement of those rights. Direct judicial review or the implementation of an
administrative-type law model are the most practical and workable methods of
enforcement.
Legislative proposals which utilize an administrative law approach have
been introduced in two states.' In Pennsylvania the proposal' 2' establishes
legislative and adjudicative bodies. A three-member board, consisting of an
attorney, a psychiatrist, and a physician, would hold hearings and make decisions
on patient allegations. The bill limits a patient to one petition per six-month
period. A Michigan bilP22 is patterned after the Pennsylvania model, but differs
117 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
118 See generally Schwitzgebel, Implementing a Right to Effective Treatment, LAw &
PsYcH. REv., Spring 1975, at 200.
119 Kenneth Donaldson was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957. He was kept in custody there
against his will for nearly 15 years. Throughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly but
unsuccessfully demanded his release, claiming that he was neither dangerous nor mentally
ill, and that at any rate the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness.
Finally, in February 1971, Donaldson successfully brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
alleging that the defendants had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional
right to liberty. See also Rosenberg, Treatment Denied-The Case of Arnold H. Marman,
57 GEO. L.J. 702 (1969).
120 The states are Pennsylvania and Michigan. See notes 121-22 infra.
121 S.B. 1274, H.B. 2118, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess. The bill, with few changes, was
resubmitted during the 1969 session. S.B. 158, H.B. 816, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1969 Sess.
See generally Hoffman, supra note 60, at 313-15.
122 This bill is described in Morris, Legal Problems Involved in Implementing the Right
to Treatment, 1 BULL. Am. ACADEMY OF PSYCHIA TRY & THE LAW 1 '(1973). See also Hoff-
man, supra note 60, at 313-15.
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significantly in that it does not provide for an adjudicative agency. Like its
Pennsylvania counterpart, the bill calls for the establishment of a committee to
promulgate quantitative standards. Commentators have suggested that the
absence of provisions for qualitative standards may be due to resistance from the
community of mental health professionals.'2 3 A third proposal urging an admin-
istrative law model includes provisions for a rulemaking body, case deciding
peronnel, legal aid service, and a panel of mental health judges.'24
The advantages of using an administrative model for the enforcement of
postcommitment rights are numerous. Generally they include speed, expertise,
and flexibility. Adjudicatory boards relieve congested court dockets and provide
expertise in evaluation. Nonjudicial intervention also allows mental health
professions to avoid court proceedings and focus on treatment. Furthermore, it
is argued that this type of approach preserves the therapeutic relationship be-
tween patient and psychiatrist during the proceedings.'
Unfortunately, the above approaches also contain many deficiencies. The
proposals preclude or limit the patient's access to the courts and place a restriction
on the frequency and number of petitions a patient may file for relief. Adjudi-
catory boards or .committees act as a buffer zone between the courts and the
patients. This could very easily lead to the traditional deference by the judiciary
and perpetuation of inadequate facilities and treatment. The economic feasi-
bility of creating more bureaucratic positions would divert resources which
could be allocated for improvement in physical facilities and treatment programs
themselves. 6
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the administrative approach may
be an outgrowth of the treatment paradigm which has led to many of the prob-
lems alluded to previously.'27 By simply labeling all social deviates as being
mentally ill, it makes it easier for society to shift, and hide, its responsibilities.
Furthermore, each of the above proposals was developed in whole or part by
mental health professionals. This fact may represent a conscious or unconscious
effort on their part to protect their domain by making provisions for mental
health professionals to create the standards involved, and in some cases, also
enforce them. 2
It is submitted that enforcement of statutory and constitutional postcommit-
ment rights should be directly controlled by the courts. Self-regulation by hospital
123 Hoffman, a professor of psychiatry, recently made the following statement on this
subject:
The reluctance of the draftsmen of these bills to allow qualitative rulemaking may
be due to resistance from the medical community seeking to preserve the privacy of
the physician-patient relationship and the physician's prerogative to prescribe that
treatment which he deems most suitable for his patient.
Hoffman, supra note 60, at 314. Professional reluctance to allow qualitative rules may addi-
tionally be attributable to the profession's quest for self-regulation.
124 Id. at 315-18.
125 Id. at 312-39.
126 Id. at 339.
127 See notes 1-8 & accompanying discussion supra.
128 The American Psychiatric Association responded to the Rouse decision by stating "the
definition of treatment and the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for medical determi-
nation." American Psychiatric Ass'n, A Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of
Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 458 (1967).
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and staff is not effectual as the past clearly demonstrates.' 29 The judiciary is in
a more neutral position from which it can act as an impartial evaluator, and
prevent the deprivation of legal rights. Judicial review of appropriate standards
respects the doctor-patient relationship and would not impose on the psychiatrists
in diagnosing and selecting treatment methods. As Chief Judge Bazelon has
suggested, the function of the judge would be to scrutinize the record and make
sure a qualified professional has made a responsible exercise of judgment and
that the patient's constitutional and statutory rights have not been infringed
upon.13 Direct judicial review is also consistent with the least restrictive alter-
native doctrine. It does not take a psychiatrist or medical expert to review the
patient's record and to ascertain whether or not the minimum quantitative
constitutional standards have been met, and to look at the duration of confine-
ment against the results realized.
VIII. Conclusion
The right to treatment theory originated as a means to improve the con-
ditions of mental hospitals. While the concept has generated considerable legal
and medical commentary, the reality remains that mental institutions, and con-
ditions therein, have not been significantly improved."3 States have not increased
the allocation of resources to such facilities, nor have patients been ordered re-
leased in any significant numbers because of the lack of treatment.'
32
Like the development of institutions themselves, right to treatment theories
have been premised on the erroneous assumption that mental illness is a medical
malady capable of being eradicated through medical or psychiatrical treatment
within mental hospitals. The emphasis has been placed on improving the con-
ditions in mental facilities instead of addressing the more fundamental problems
posed by involuntary civil confinement itself. Because the right to liberty and
other fundamental rights are involved, less drastic alternatives to institutional-
ization should be explored and ordered. Realistic standards accordingly, must be
implemented; qualitative standards in addition to quantitative standards must
be applied. The states' failure to provide such alternatives should not allow the
perpetuation of existing conditions. In the absence of legislative action the
judiciary must provide the constitutional protections required and not delegate
its authority to others.
Ray A. Foianini
129 See note 15 supra.
130 See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1969).
131 See generally B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972).
132 Id.
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